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Abstract—The goals of the present contribution are twofold. First, we propose the use of a non-Gaussian long-range dependent
process to model Internet traffic aggregated time series. We give the definitions and intuition behind the use of this model. We detail
numerical procedures that can be used to synthesize artificial traffic exactly following the model prescription. We also propose original
and practically effective procedures to estimate the corresponding parameters from empirical data. We show that this empirical model
relevantly describes a large variety of Internet traffic, including both regular traffic obtained from public reference repositories and traffic
containing legitimate (flash crowd) or illegitimate (DDoS attack) anomalies. We observe that the proposed model accurately fits the
data for a wide range of aggregation levels. The model provides us with a meaningful multiresolution (i.e., aggregation level
dependent) statistics to characterize the traffic: the evolution of the estimated parameters with respect to the aggregation level. It
opens the track to the second goal of the paper: anomaly detection. We propose the use of a quadratic distance computed on these
statistics to detect the occurrences of DDoS attack and study the statistical performance of these detection procedures. Traffic with
anomalies was produced and collected by us so as to create a controlled and reproducible database, allowing for a relevant
assessment of the statistical performance of the proposed (modeling and detection) procedures.
Index Terms—Traffic statistical modeling, DoS attack, flash crowd, non-Gaussian long-range dependent process.
Ç
1 MOTIVATION
THE Internet is becoming the universal communicationnetwork, conveying all kinds of information, ranging
from the simple transfer of binary computer data to the real-
time transmission of voice, video, or interactive informa-
tion. Simultaneously, the Internet is evolving from a single
best effort service into a multiservice network, a major
consequence being that it becomes highly exposed to
attacks, especially to denial of services (DoS) and distrib-
uted DoS (DDoS) attacks. DoS attacks are responsible for
large changes in traffic characteristics which may, in turn,
significantly reduce the quality of service (QoS) level
perceived by all users of the network. This may result in
breaking of the service level agreement, with the Internet
Service Provider being at fault, potentially causing major
financial losses for them.
Detecting and reacting against DoS attacks is therefore a
major issue that is continuously receiving numerous
research efforts. However, this is also a difficult task and
current intrusion detection systems (IDS), especially those
based on anomaly detection from profile, often fail in
detecting DDoS attacks efficiently. This can be explained via
different lines of arguments. First, DDoS attacks can take a
large variety of forms so that proposing a common
definition is in itself a complex issue. Second, it is
commonly observed that Internet traffic under normal
conditions presents per se, or naturally, large fluctuations
and variations in its throughput at all scales [1], often
described in terms of scaling [2], long memory [3], self-
similarity [4], and multifractality [5]. Such properties
significantly impair anomaly detection procedures by
decreasing their statistical performance. Third, Internet
traffic may exhibit strong, possibly sudden, however
legitimate, variations (flash crowds, for instance, such as
the notorious Slashdot effect) that may be hard to
distinguish from illegitimate ones. Fourth, profile-based
IDS generally do not rely on the use of rich enough
statistical models that correctly account for the large
variability of traffic. They are mainly based on monitoring
simple traffic parameters, such as its throughput or packet
rate, and most IDS make use of specific packet sequences
known as attack signatures [6]. Alarms are raised whenever
a threshold is reached [7], [8], [9], [10], often yielding a
significant number of false positives [11], a major short-
coming for their actual use. The current evolution of
Internet traffic, allowing for a larger variety of traffic and
diversity of communication, results in an increase of
difficulties to design efficient IDS.
Recently, various Internet traffic monitoring projects
have obtained important improvements in traffic modeling.
Mostly, they have better taken into account the large
variability and scaling properties mentioned above via the
use of richer statistics of the traffic, such as correlation
functions or spectra. This has significantly renewed IDS
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design strategies. For instance, Ye relied on a Markov
modeling of the traffic time behavior [12]. Other authors
have shown that DDoS attacks increase correlations in
traffic and indicated that a robust detection technique can
be based on this observation [13], [14]. Making use of traffic
intercorrelation across different links, Lakhina et al. have
proposed a method for detecting network wide anomalies
using traffic matrices [15]. Hussain et al. have defined
spectral density signatures for attacks [16]. Similarly,
spectral estimation has been used for comparing traffic
with and without attacks [17]. While spectral densities
exhibit peaks around the Round Trip Time values for
regular traffic, such peaks tend to disappear under attacks,
and this observation can then be used for IDS design.
Finally, Li and Lee used the wavelet technique developed in
[18] to compute a so-called energy distribution; it was
observed that this energy distribution presents peaks under
attacks that do not exist for regular traffic [19]. Works in
[20], [21] exploit the multiresolution nature of wavelet
decompositions to track and detect traffic anomalies in a so-
called medium range of scales.
The present contribution, conducted in the framework of
the METROSEC (Metrology for Security) project (see
http://www.laas.fr/METROSEC), continues along this re-
search line. It is organized around two major goals: Internet
traffic statistical modeling and attack detection. Mainly, it
aims at analyzing the impact of anomalies on the (para-
meters) of the statistical modeling as well as at determining
discriminative profile signatures for traffic containing
legitimate (e.g., flash crowds) and illegitimate (e.g., DDoS
attacks) anomalies. First, a long-range dependent non-
Gaussian stochastic process is introduced and argued for.
Its definition and properties, together with numerical
synthesis and parameter estimation procedures, are fully
worked out in Section 3. Section 4 shows that this model
describes, accurately and relevantly, both a wide variety of
Internet traffic time series (available from major public
international trace repositories) and traffic containing
anomalies (generated by ourselves), be they legitimate or
not. The originality of the proposed statistical modeling lies
in its multiresolution nature (several aggregation levels !s
are jointly analyzed). It provides us with robust statistics
(the evolution of the model parameters with respect to !),
jointly taking into account the marginal distributions and
the correlation structure of the aggregated traffic, thus
opening the track to the second goal of the paper: anomaly
detections.
The detection procedure proposed here is based on
identifying changes in the model parameter evolutions and,
hence, ruptures in the statistical modeling. Therefore, it is
generic and robust as it does not depend on any specific
anomaly or attack production mechanism. The detection
procedure consists of computing quadratic distances between
the statistics estimated from a sliding observation time
window and those obtained from an a priori chosen
reference window. Then, distances are thresholded to yield
detections. A key issue in validating anomaly detection
procedure lies in the assessment of its statistical perfor-
mance. As it is difficult to have at our disposal traces
containing a labeled and documented set of attacks that
could be used to benchmark detection procedures, we have
chosen to perform a collection of DDoS attacks and flash
crowd anomalies, whose characteristics and parameters can
be modified in a controlled and reproducible manner. Both
regular data and data containing labeled anomalies are
described in Section 2, together with the operating modes
used to perform various DDoS attacks and flash crowd.
From this database, we can evaluate the statistical perfor-
mance (detection versus false alarm probabilities) and
reliability of the proposed detection procedures. Though
this approach may seem artificial or simplistic, we see this
reference database production methodology as a manda-
tory step for the reliable development and validation of an
attack detection method. Detection procedures as well as
their statistical performance are detailed in Section 5. Both
regular data and data containing labeled anomalies are
described in Section 2, together with the operating modes
used to perform various DDoS attacks and flash crowd.
Section 6 concludes with further developments under
investigation.
2 DATA AND EXPERIMENTS
2.1 Traffic without Anomalies
The model and analysis proposed hereafter are first
illustrated on regular traffic (i.e., traffic presenting a priori
no anomaly), fully described in Table 1. We use both
standard data, gathered from major available Internet traces
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TABLE 1
Regular Traffic
Description for the studied traces containing no anomaly. For each trace, T denotes the time duration (in seconds), # Pkts ð106Þ the number of
packets (in millions), and IAT the mean interarrival time (in ms).
repositories, and time series collected by us within the
METROSEC research project. Therefore, we cover a
significant variety of traffic, networks (Local Area Network,
Wide Area Network, etc., and edge networks, core net-
works, etc.) and links, collected over the last 17 years (from
1989 to 2006). For each repository, a large number of traces
are available; we have focused here on a few that are
representative of a collection of others. PAUG corresponds
to one of the celebrated Bellcore Ethernet LAN traces, over
which long-range dependence was first evidenced [22].
LBL-TCP-3 is provided by the Lawrence Berkeley Labora-
tory and was collected at LAN gateways. Multifractal
models were validated for the first time in computer
network traffic on these data [5], [23]. AUCK-IV constitutes
high precision TCP/IP traces gathered at the Internet access
point of the University of Auckland over a nonsaturated
link and made available by WAND. We have also processed
one of the CAIDA time series, another high timestamp
precision, collected over a large backbone, kindly made
available by CAIDA from their MFN network. UNC
corresponds to data collected at the University of North
Carolina in 2003. The METROSEC data were collected from
late 2004 to early 2006 on the RENATER1 network using
DAG systems [24] deployed in the framework of the
METROPOLIS and METROSEC French research projects.
2.2 Traffic (or Traces) with Anomalies
To assess the relevance and performance of our data
modeling and anomaly detection procedures, we need to
have at our disposal a set of traffic containing labeled and
documented anomalies. Because no such repository of
reliable anomalies exists, we have created a database of
legitimate (flash crowds) and illegitimate (DDoS attacks)
anomalies, produced in a reproducible, accurate, and
controlled manner. This section details the anomaly
production methodology and characteristics.
2.2.1 DDoS Attack
Experimental setting. We performed UDP flooding DDoS
attacks using either IPERF [25] or Trinoo [26] (on computers
with Linux distribution) to generate UDP flows with
different throughputs. Compared to IPERF, Trinoo uses a
“daemon” installed on each attacking site (four French
research laboratories located in Mont-de-Marsan, Lyon,
Nice, and Paris) and enabled us to create more complex and
realistic attacks. The single computer target was located at
LAAS in Toulouse. The traffic related to these attacks was
transported via the French national network for education
and research (RENATER). DDoS attacks were performed so
as to be able to reproduce and modify their characteristics
(duration, DoS flow intensity, packets length, and sending
rate). In each case, traffic was collected by us (for a duration
of 60 or 90 minutes, the attack mostly occurred during the
second third) before, during, and after the DDoS so that
regular traffic can be analyzed before and after each attack.
The contribution of the attacks to the global throughput of
the monitored link is highly variable, depending on the
attack parameters and ranging from a major impact on the
global traffic profile (IV, V, and X) to attacks that are
completely hidden in the global traffic (I and II). Attacks X
and tT were, for instance, designed to be clearly dominant
in the traffic, whereas attack tM was to be almost hidden.
Attack parameters and characteristics are fully detailed in
Table 2.
DDoS attack traffic characteristics. The LAAS is con-
nected to RENATER with an 100 Mbps Ethernet link that
has not been overflowed during attacks. Therefore, most of
the conducted attacks have remained low in traffic volume
so that they cannot be easily detected via simple statistics
such as sample mean or variance estimates. Anyway, the
goal of the detection procedures proposed in Section 5 is to
detect anomalies even and mostly when their intensity level
remains low, i.e., before they have a negative impact on the
network QoS. Experiments were conducted to emulate this
situation.
The plots illustrating the modeling of the DDoS were
obtained from the reference DDoS, labeled R in Table 2. For
instance, Fig. 1 shows, respectively, the numbers of packets
and flows on the LAAS access link. While the former
remains quite stable, the latter presents a significant
increase (the packet rate is multiplied by almost 3 during
the attack). But, this change remains in the range of the
natural fluctuations of Internet traffic. However, note that
SCHERRER ET AL.: NON-GAUSSIAN AND LONG MEMORY STATISTICAL CHARACTERIZATIONS FOR INTERNET TRAFFIC WITH ANOMALIES 3
1. RENATER is the French network for education and research that
interconnects academics and some industrial partners, see http://
www.renater.fr/ for topology and further informations.
TABLE 2
Traffic with Anomalies
Description of the studied traces containing anomalies. Run R stands for
the reference attack and FC-1 and FC-2 for the flash crowd used to
validate our model on traffic with anomalies. The Upper part, FC-1 and
FC-2, flash crowd anomalies (FC-1 is plotted in 2 and used to validate
our model on traffic with anomaly). In the middle part, DDoS attacks
performed with IPerf in 2004 and 2005; run R stands for the reference
attack (see Fig. 1). In the lower part, attacks performed with Trinoo in
2006. For each trace and attack, ti, ta, T , and TA stand, respectively, for
the starting times (in local time) and durations (in seconds) of the whole
trace and of the anomalies. D, V , and I refer, respectively, to the
controlled throughput of each attacking source (in Mbps), the length of
each attack packet (in bytes), and the attack relative intensity (i.e., the
ratio between the sum of all attack flows and the average throughput on
the LAAS link during attack).
all of the modeling (see Section 4) and detection procedures
(see Section 5) described here were applied to each and
every time series reported in Tables 1 and 2 and it has been
checked that satisfactory and consistent results were
obtained.
2.2.2 Flash Crowd
Experimental setting. We created anomalies that are
considered legitimate under the guise of flash crowds
(FC) on a Web server. Our goal was to generate realistic
FCs. This is why we chose not to use automatic programs or
robots, but to involve human volunteers. To do so, we asked
to a large number of people (mostly French academics but
not only) to browse the LAAS Web site (http://
www.laas.fr). The LAAS Web site contains a large variety
of files of all sizes, from simple html pages to movies, big
reports, high definition pictures (of nano devices, etc.),
movies (of autonomous robots, etc.), etc. There is every
indication of heavy-tailed file sizes on this Web site as is
largely expected. Participants were instructed to browse the
Web server on their own, as they would do in the real world
when visiting a Web site publishing a new set of
information they would be interested in. Precise starting
and stopping times were given. FC lasted 30 minutes or so.
A detailed analysis of the IP addresses present in the LAAS
incoming traffic enabled us to identify academic labora-
tories and to find out that more than 100 people partici-
pated. Information sent to us by participants enabled us to
say that at least 50 more people took part in the FC from
their individual and personal ISPs.
FC traffic characteristics. Illustrations are presented on
FC-1 (see Table 2). Fig. 2a shows the number of (HTTP GET)
requests received by the LAAS Web server, distinguishing
between inner and outer requests. One can clearly see that
most people started browsing the LAAS Web server
precisely when instructed (important increase of the
number of hits), but also that some of them did not
participate for the entire 30 minutes. Fig. 2 shows,
respectively, the numbers of flows and the packet rate on
the LAAS access link. As expected, both plots show an
increase in the average number of flows and in the average
packet rate during the flash crowd.
Fig. 2c also shows increases in the average packet rate
(20 minutes) before and (15 minutes) after the flash crowd
experiment. To understand those increases, we have
analyzed the different components of the traffic using the
QoSMOS Traffic Designer tool [27] (see Fig. 2d). It revealed
that the increase occurring round 2 p.m. (before the FC) and
is caused by people inside LAAS browsing the Web right
after lunch. Such a pattern has been observed systematically
on all traces collected on the LAAS access link since then.
The second peak after the experiment appears to be due to
SMTP traffic. Two explanations can be given for why. First,
many researchers at LAAS use Web-mail. Because the
server was significantly slowed down during the flash
crowd experiment, they had to stop sending e-mails until
the Web server again started to work with satisfactory
performance. Second, the gray listing mechanism (used for
spam reduction) delays some e-mails and sends them all at
a scheduled door opening. The nearest one took place at
3.15 p.m., just after the end of the flash crowd.
Note that the FC are used as examples of increase in
traffic that are not attacks, and the peaks we just
commented on are other occurrences of legitimate increase
of the traffic. We will see in Section 5 that they would not be
detected as attacks or anomalies by the detection procedure
we propose based on the statistical model developed in the
very next section.
3 NON-GAUSSIAN LONG-RANGE DEPENDENT
PROCESSES
3.1 The Gamma Arfima Model
3.1.1 Point Process versus Aggregated Traffic
Computer network traffic consists of IP packets arrival
processes. Thus, a general description can be formulated in
terms of marked point processes fðtl; AlÞ; l ¼ 0; 1; 2; . . .g,
where the tl denotes the arrival time stamp of the lth packet
and Al some attributes of the packet (such as its payload, its
application/source/destination ports, etc.). It has long been
observed that such arrival processes differ from simple
standard Poisson or renewal processes, see, for instance,
[28]. The interarrivals are not independent but display
intricate correlation structures. It could be modeled using
either nonstationary Point processes [29] or stationary
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Fig. 1. DDoS Attack. Time series corresponding to the numbers per second of (a) packets and (b) connections.
Markov modulated Point processes [30]. However, given
the huge number of packets involved in any computer
network traffic, these models would result in huge data
sets. Therefore, one often prefers to work on byte or packet
aggregated count processes, denoted W!ðkÞ and X!ðkÞ.
They consist of the number of bytes (respectively, packets)
that live within the kth window of size ! > 0, i.e., whose
timestamps lie between k! $ tl < ðkþ 1Þ!. Various traffic
models (including stationary or multifractal processes [31])
for X! and W!have been proposed in, e.g., [5], [32], [33],
[34], [35], [36], [37], and a review of traffic models can be
found in, e.g., [4], [38]. However, it is commonly accepted
that the marginal distributions and auto-covariance func-
tions are the two major factors that affect the performance of
the network and, hence, that need to be accounted for in
priority. Thus, we mainly concentrate here on the joint
modeling of the marginal distributions and covariance
functions of X!ðkÞ (modeling W!ðkÞ gives equivalent
results not reported here for the sake of clarity).
3.1.2 Non-Gaussian Marginals: Gamma Distributions
By definition, X!ðkÞ is a positive random variable (RV).
Hence, various works propose describing the marginals of
aggregated traffic with classical positive RV distributions
such as (one-sided) exponential, log-normal, Weibull, or
gamma distributions [38]. Because of the packet arrival
nature of the traffic, Poisson and exponential distributions
are expected at small aggregation levels ! for the marginals
of X!ðkÞ, while, for data aggregated at larger !s, Gaussian
laws are relevant approximations, as suggested by a central
limit argument. However, none of them can satisfactorily
model traffic marginals for a wide range of (small and
large) !s. A recurrent issue in traffic modeling lies in the
choice of the relevant aggregation level !. This is an
enduring question the answer to which involves the
characteristics of the data themselves together with the
goal of the modeling as well as technical issues such as real
time, buffer size, and computational cost constraints.
Therefore, it would be of great interest to have at our
disposal a statistical model that may be relevant for a large
range of values of !. In the present work, we choose to use
Gamma distributions, "!;" , to model aggregated traffic
because: 1) they naturally offer a smooth and continuous
evolution from exponential to Gaussian laws and 2) the
empirical studies reported here suggest that they are able to
best capture the marginals of X! over a wide range of !s.
A "!;" distribution is defined for positive RV as:
"!;"ðxÞ ¼ 1
""ð!Þ
x
"
! "!&1
exp & x
"
! "
; ð1Þ
where "ðuÞ is the standard Gamma function (see, e.g., [39]).
It has mean # ¼ !" and variance $2 ¼ !"2. "!;" laws are
stable under multiplication and addition. If X is "!;" , then
%X is "!;%" , showing that " mostly acts as a multiplicative,
or scaling, factor. For any two Xi and i ¼ 1; 2 independent
RVs "!i;" , their sum X ¼ X1 þX2 follows a "!1þ!2;" law.
Therefore, the (inverse of the) shape parameter, 1=!, acts as
an indicator of the distance from a Gaussian law. For
instance, skewness and kurtosis (relative third and fourth
moments) behave, respectively, as 2=
ffiffiffi
!
p
and 3þ 6=!.
Hence, ! is referred to as the shape parameter, controlling
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Fig. 2. Flash Crowd. (a) Http requests, (b) connections, (c) packets, and (d) distribution of throughputs per second time series. (d) follows a top-
down approach: The application on top generates the larger traffic.
the (smooth and continuous) evolution from exponential to
Gaussian distributions.
3.1.3 Long-Range versus Short-Range Dependencies:
ARFIMA Covariance
After the seminal work reported in [22], it has been
commonly accepted that computer network traffic is
characterized by a long memory or long-range dependence
property (see [40], [41]) (LRD). It is usually defined by the
behavior at the origin of the power spectral density fX!ð&Þ:
fX!ð&Þ ' Cj&j&2d; j&j ! 0; with 0 < d < 0:5: ð2Þ
LRD constitutes a central property in traffic modeling as
it is likely to be responsible for the decrease in both the QoS
and the performance of the network (see, e.g., [42]).
Incorporating it precisely into description models is there-
fore a crucial issue. It would allow us to perform accurate
and relevant network design (buffer size, etc.) and
performance predictions (delay as a function of utility,
etc.). LRD rules out the use of processes such as Poisson,
Markov, or Auto-Regressive Moving Average (ARMA)
processes, as well as other declinations such as Markov
Modulated Poisson Processes [43]. Instead, canonical long-
range dependent processes, such as fractional Brownian
motion, fractional Gaussian noise [44], or Fractionally
Integrated processes, have been widely used to describe
and/or analyze Internet times series (see [4] and the
references therein). It is also interesting to note that long
memory can be incorporated directly into point processes
using cluster point process models, yielding a fruitful
description of the packet arrival processes, as pointed out in
[45]. However, because of the many different network
mechanisms and various source characteristics, short-term
dependencies are also present and superimposed on this
long memory property (this has been explored for VBR
video traffic, see, for instance, [46]). Therefore, we use the
covariance function (or spectrum) of the Auto-Regressive
Fractionally Integrated Moving Average (ARFIMA, or
arfima hereafter) process [40], a natural choice as it allows
us to account for both short and long-range dependencies.
The covariance function of an arfimaðP; d;QÞ process, X,
is fully defined via two polynomials of order P and Q, a
fractional integration D&d, of order &1=2 < d < 1=2, and a
power multiplicative constant $2. Its power spectral
density, or spectrum (Fourier transform of the covariance
function), takes the following analytical form:
fXð&Þ ¼ $2' j1& e&i2(&j&2d
j1&PQq¼1 )qe&iq2(&j2
j1&PPp¼1 *pe&ip2(&j2 ; ð3Þ
for &1=2 < & < 1=2. It is evident that, in the limit j&j ! 0,
fXð&Þ ' $2' j&j&2d and (compared to (2)) that, for d 2 ð0; 1=2Þ,
X is a long-range dependent process. Hence, the parameter
d accounts for the long-range dependence property and
measures its “strength.” Conversely, the polynomials P and
Q (i.e., the ARMAðP;QÞ contribution to the arfima process)
can be used to fit the spectrum at high frequencies or,
equally, the covariance function at fine scales, in an
independent and versatile way. Hence, they model the
short-range correlations.
3.1.4 Comments
To model aggregated Internet time series, we therefore
propose using a stochastic stationary nonGaussian long-
range dependent process: the Gamma (marginal) arfima
(covariance) process. This models the benefits of a number
of qualities and calls for a number of comments.
1. The specifications of the first and second order
statistical properties described above do not fully
characterize the process, because this model is not
Gaussian. Room for further design to adjust other
properties of the traffic remains available in the
framework of the model. This difficult to achieve
task is under investigation with respect to detection
purposes.
2. The Gamma-arfima model is fully prescribed by a
small number of parameters. For the analysis and
the illustrations reported in the present work, we
restrict ourselves to the use of arfima processes with
polynomials P and Q of degree 1, hereafter labeled
arfimað*; d; )Þ (* and ) are the sole coefficient of the
normalized polynomials P and Q). Then, the
"!;"-arfimað*; d; )Þ processes involve only five para-
meters that need to be adjusted from the data. As
such, they are parsimonious models, a much desired
property as far as robust, practical, efficient real-time
on-the-fly network monitoring issues are concerned.
3. As is reported in the next section, the model fits
Internet data for a large range of aggregation levels,
!. Therefore, it contains a form of covariance with
respect to changes in the chosen resolution of
analysis.
4. Most of all, the proposed model accurately models
not only traffic both with and without anomalies.
Compared to other models, it proves useful to
design anomaly detection procedures and to per-
form classification.
3.2 Numerical Synthesis
3.2.1 Principles
The goal of this section is to present an original procedure
that enables us to numerically synthesize sample paths (of
any length) of stochastic processes with prescribed "!;"
marginals and arfimað); d;*Þ covariance. Our construction
consists of a three step procedure, stemming from ideas in
[47], [48] and extending them to the Gamma case.
1. X, a "!;" RV, can be obtained as X ¼
Pi¼2!
i¼1 Y
2
i ,
where the Yis are zero-mean independent identically
distributed Gaussian random variables, with var-
iance $2Y .
2. We can analytically relate the covariance of the
process XðkÞ, +XðlÞ ¼ $2X,XðlÞ, to that of the YiðkÞ,
+Y ðlÞ ¼ $2Yi,Y ðlÞ. The computation is derived below.
3. We synthesize 2! zero mean Gaussian processes Yi,
with prescribed covariance +Y ð-Þ ¼ $2Y ,Y ð-Þ, using
the so-called circulant embedded matrix method
(see, e.g., [49] for a review).
Obviously, the procedure we propose here works only
for integer !. An efficient approximation for noninteger !
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can be obtained.
3.2.2 Derivation of the Key Result
First, one can easily obtain that IEX ¼ !" ¼ 2!$2Y and
$2X ¼ !"2 ¼ 4!$4Y ; hence, $2Y ¼ "=2. Second, from the
canonical decomposition Y ðkþ lÞ ¼ ,Y ðlÞY ðkÞ þ Zðk; lÞ one
can show that Zðk; lÞ is a Gaussian random variable, with
IEZðk; lÞ ¼ 0; IEZ2ðk; lÞ ¼ $2Y ð1& ,2Y ðlÞÞ;
and IEY ðkÞZðk; lÞ ¼ 0:
One can derive from these results that
IEY 2ðkÞY 2ðkþ lÞ ¼ $4Y ð1þ 2,2Y ðlÞÞ:
Combining those findings with the fact that the Yi are i.i.d.
zero-mean Gaussian processes, tedious calculations not
reported here lead to the following original and analytical
result:
,X ¼ ,2Y or +X ¼ 4!+2Y : ð4Þ
3.2.3 Traffic Generators
The synthesis procedure described above can be extended
to other types of marginals (log-normal, exponential, chi-
squared, etc.) and covariances (fractional Gaussian noise
(fGn), kinked fGn, etc.). Preliminary results are available in
[50]. Other forms of statistical dependencies may be
incorporated as well, including higher order statistics. Such
synthesis procedures have been used for the validation of
the analysis procedure, especially the estimation perfor-
mance. Also, they constitute traffic generators for non-
Gaussian long-range dependent traffic that can be used, for
instance, to feed simulation platforms aiming at estimating
QoS and network performance.
3.3 Practical Parameter Estimation
This section details the practical estimation procedures for
the gamma-arfima parameters used on actual data. While
the estimation of ! and " makes use of standard
procedures, that of the arfima parameters is based on an
original combination of techniques used for long-range and
short-range correlations independently.
3.3.1 Gamma Parameter Estimation
Instead of the usual moment-based technique, "^ ¼ $^2=#^,
!^ ¼ #^="^, where #^ and $^2 consist of the standard sample
mean and variance estimators, we use maximum like-
lihood-based estimates for the parameters ! and " [51]. The
joint distribution of n i.i.d. "!;" variables can be obtained as
a product of n terms as in (1). Derivation of this product
with respect to ! and " yields the estimates. It is important
to note that the term ML standardly attributed to that
method is used abusively here. Obviously, in our case, the
X!ðkÞ are strongly dependent and hence do not satisfy the
i.i.d. assumption. It has been checked empirically from
numerical simulations that this estimation procedure
provides us with very accurate estimates even when
applied to processes with long-range dependence [50].
3.3.2 Arfima Parameter Estimation
It is well known that the estimation of the long memory
parameter is a difficult statistical task that has received a
considerable amount of works and attention (see, e.g., [49]
for an up-to-date review), and so has the joint estimation of
both long and short range parameters of the arfimað*; d; )Þ
process. Full maximum likelihood estimation based on the
analytical form of the spectrum recalled in (3) is possible
but computationally heavy. Here, we develop an original
two step practically effective estimation procedure.
First, the long-range dependence parameter d is estimated
using a standard wavelet-based methodology [52]. Let
 j;kðtÞ ¼ 2&j=2 0ð2&jt& kÞ denote an orthonormal wavelet
basis, designed from the mother wavelet  0, and dXðj; kÞ ¼
h j;k;X0i the corresponding wavelet coefficients. For any
second order stationary processX, its spectrum fXð&Þ can be
related to its wavelet coefficients through [18], [53]:
IEdXðj; kÞ2 ¼
Z
fXð&Þ2jj#0ð2j&Þj2d&; ð5Þ
where #0 stands for the Fourier transform of  0 and IE for
the mathematical expectation. When X is a long-range
dependent process, with parameter d, (2) implies that
IEdXðj; kÞ2 ' C22jd if 2j ! þ1. It has been proven that the
time averages Sj ¼ ð1=njÞ
Pnj
k¼1 jdXðj; kÞj2 can then be used
as relevant, efficient, and robust estimators for IEdXðj; kÞ2.
Together with (5) above, this property leads to the following
estimation procedure: A weighted linear regression of
log2 Sj against log2 2
j ¼ j, performed in the limit of the
coarsest scales, provides us with an estimate of d. The plots
log2 Sj versus log2 2
j ¼ j are commonly referred to as
logscale diagrams (LD). The full definition as well as the
performance of this estimation procedure are detailed in
[18], [53], [54].
Second, from this wavelet-based estimate d^, we perform
a fractional derivation of order d^ of X!. It removes the long
memory from the process so that only the ARMA
component is left. A standard iterative procedure (based
on a Gauss-Newton algorithm) [55] is then applied to
estimate the ARMA parameters. Obviously, the major
weakness of this two steps estimation procedure lies in
the fact that if d is poorly estimated, so are the ARMA
parameters. However, the estimation performance of the
procedure is studied numerically in [50] using a synthetic
"!;" arfimað*; d; )Þ process.
4 TRAFFIC MODELING
The "!;"-arfimað*; d; )Þ analysis procedures are applied,
independently for different levels of aggregation, to the
various traffic time series described in Section 2, containing
anomalies or not. For the theoretical modeling of X!,
stationarity is assumed. We first check the consistency of
the results obtained for adjacent nonoverlapping subblocks.
Then, we analyze only data sets for which stationarity is a
reasonable hypothesis. This approach is very close in spirit
to the ones developed in [56], [57]. Then, we estimate the
parameters of the model for each chosen !. Results are
analyzed and interpreted.
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4.1 Regular Traffic
We give here detailed results for the AUCK-IV series and
for the Metrosec-ref1 series only. Similar results are
obtained for the other series (see Table 1); they are not
reported here and are available on request.
4.1.1 Covariances
Figs. 3 and 5, bottom row, compare, for the two chosen time
series, respectively, the empirical LDs against their best fits
obtained with the arfima covariance model. The latter are
computed numerically from the combination of (3) and (5)
with the estimated d^, )^, and *^. This numerical procedure
has been developed in collaboration with Veitch et al., see
[58]. The LD plots illustrate the relevance of the
arfimað*; d; )Þ fits of the covariances of X!. As ! increases,
one can notice that the LDs almost correspond to coarser
versions of the LD obtained at finer !s, shifted toward the
upper scales. This is easily understood: Aggregating data
mainly consists of smoothing out details at fine scales
though leaving coarse scales unaffected. The plots also
clearly show that the onset of long memory occurs around
j ¼ 10, i.e., around 1s, hence providing us with a character-
istic time scale separating short from long correlation time
scales. As may have been expected, aggregation does not
cancel the long memory and does not alter it. It can be
checked in Figs. 4 and 6, bottom left, where the d^ remain
remarkably independent of !. This underlines that long-
range dependence captures a long-time feature of the traffic
that has no inner time-scale. The situation is very different
for the short-time correlations that are cancelled out when
the aggregation level increases, see the Figs. 4 and 6, bottom
right: *^ and )^ significantly decrease as ! increases. One
expects that they would be null (or identical) when the
aggregation level ! becomes larger than the critical 1s time
scale. Indeed, under aggregation, the covariance theoreti-
cally converges to that of a fractional Gaussian noise that
turns out to be, practically, extremely close to that of an
arfimað0; d; 0Þ [40].
To finish, let us note that, for some time-series (CAIDA),
higher order for the ARMA part of the arfima model proved
necessary to model the covariance.
4.1.2 Marginals
Figs. 3 and 5, top rows, show empirical histograms,
obtained from the chosen time series, together with the
"!;" fits. They illustrate the relevance of the "!;"
distributions to model the marginals of X!, for a wide
range of aggregation levels: 1ms $ ! $ 10s. The
adequacy of the fits has been characterized by means of
.2 goodness-of-fit tests. Gamma distributions usually
show a better adequacy compared to those obtained from
exponential, log-normal, and .2 laws. For some of the
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Fig. 3. AUCK-IV. "!;"-arfimað*; d; )Þ fits for the marginals (top row) and covariances (bottom) for! ¼ 10; 100; 400ms (left to right); j ¼ 1 corresponds
to 10 ms.
Fig. 4. AUCK-IV. Estimated "!;"-arfimað*; d; )Þ parameters as a function
of log2! (with ! in ms).
analyzed time series and some aggregation levels, one of
the other laws may better adjust the data. However, the
Gamma distributions are never significantly outperformed
and, if a particular distribution performs better than
Gamma for a given !, it does not hold over a wide range
of !s. Conversely, the adequacy of the Gamma laws
remains very satisfactory over wide ranges of !s; hence,
they provide us with a scale-evolving characterization of
the marginals of the traffic. "!;" laws, by variation of their
shape and scale parameters, offer a continuous and
smooth evolution from pure exponential to Gaussian
laws. These empirical facts are very much in favor of the
use of Gamma laws to model computer traffic marginals,
as is, from a theoretical point of view, their stability
under addition property. Indeed, aggregation implies
X2!ðkÞ ¼ X!ð2kÞ þX!ð2kþ 1Þ. Using stability under ad-
dition and assuming independence, one would expect
that ! increases linearly with ! while " remains constant.
Figs. 4 and 6, top row, show the evolution of !^ and "^ as
a function of log2!, noted !^! and "^!. Significant
departures from these behaviors under I.i.d. hypothesis
are observed. The analysis shows that !^! does not
increase at small !, then grows roughly like log2! for
larger !, whereas "^! behavior is close to a power-law
increase. These facts constitute clear evidence of the
existence of dependencies in the data and tell us the
evolutions of ! and " with ! mainly accommodate short
range dependencies of X!.
4.1.3 Synthetic Time Series
Using the synthesis method described in Section 3.2, we
produce numerical sample paths of the "!;"-arfimað); d;*Þ
for different !s. The parameters have been chosen so that
they correspond to those measured on the AUCK-IV time
series. Comparing Fig. 7 with Fig. 3, the plots illustrate that
the marginals (top row) and covariances (bottom row) of
the synthetic time-series match those of the data.
4.2 Traffic with Anomalies
4.2.1 DDoS Attack
Covariance. Fig. 8a presents the LDs for a 1 hour block of
data during the DDoS Attack ð! ¼ 1msÞ compared to those
of 1 hour long regular traffic times series, recorded a couple
of hours before and after the attack. The LD plots tell us first
that an arfimað*; d; )Þ fits the traffic under DDoS attack
equally satisfactorily. Other plots not presented here show
that this is true for a wide range of aggregation levels.
Moreover, for the behaviors of the LDs at scales larger
than 1s (j ¼ 10 in Fig. 8a), no discrepancies can be detected
between before/after and during the attack. In particular,
the long memory parameter d^ remains astonishingly
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Fig. 5. METROSEC-ref1. "!;"-arfimað*; d; )Þ fits for the marginals (top row) and covariances (bottom) for ! ¼ 10; 100; 400 ms (left to right). j ¼ 1
corresponds to 10 ms.
Fig. 6. METROSEC-ref1. Estimated parameters of "!;"-arfimað*; d; )Þ,
as a function of log2! (! in ms).
constant. It tell us that long memory is not created by the
attack and is also totally insensitive to its occurrence. The
only change that can be noticed on the LDs consists of a
relative increase of the short-time component (at scales j
from 4 to 7) after the attack. The reason is that the traffic
series after attack was recorded at night, with a lower traffic
load. The LD was shifted upward to show that the long
memory parameter d^ (given by the slope) does not change,
even when the load is smaller. Hence, DDoS attack cannot
detect the from the LDs.
Marginals. Fig. 9, left column, illustrates, in two plots,
that "!;" distributions adequately fit the marginals of the
traffic under DDoS attack. Fig. 10, left column, compares the
evolutions of the estimated !^ and "^ with respect to ! for
traffic during and before/after the DDoS event. Estimations
are performed over 15 minute-long nonoverlapping blocks
of data. One sees that the functions of !^! and "^! observed
during the DDoS attack differ significantly from those
corresponding to a regular traffic. The attack causes an
immediate and sharp increase of ! starting from the finest
!s, whereas, under normal circumstances, ! remains
constant or with only small variations up to ! ’ 20ms.
The evolution is the inverse for ": It is decreasing from
! ’ 1ms to ! ’ 30ms during the DDoS attack, whereas it
increases smoothly and regularly with ! under normal
traffic. These evolutions can receive several interpretations.
First, because, during the DDoS attack, a large number of
packets are emitted at the highest possible rate, the
probability observing 0 packet within a window of size !
decreases extremely fast to 0, even for small !s, a major
discrepancy compared to marginals observed on regular
traffic that smoothly go to 0 when X! ! 0 (compare Figs. 3
or 5 to Fig. 9). It affects the shape of the marginals and,
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Fig. 7. Synthetic data. "!;"-arfima ð*; d; )Þ fits for the marginals (top row) and covariances (bottom) of synthetic data for ! ¼ 10; 100; 400ms (left to
right). The parameters correspond to those of AUCK-IV.
Fig. 8. Logscale Diagrams. For the (a) DDoS and (b) for the Flash
Crowd. For both events, the curves are given during the anomaly
(crosses) and before (squares) or after (circles) the anomaly, taken as
references for normal traffic.
Fig. 9. Marginals. For (a) the DDoS Attack and (b) for the Flash Crowd
(right), empirical histograms of X! and their "!;" fits of the marginals, for
! ¼ 2ms (top) and ! ¼ 32ms (bottom).
hence, the value of the ! parameter, implying that ! grows
slowly with ! for regular traffic and much faster under
DDoS attack. Second, the accelerated increase of ! with
respect to ! under DDoS attack indicates that the marginal
distributions of the traffic under attack tend to Gaussian
laws much faster than under regular circumstances. Both
properties constitute major statistical features that differ-
entiate traffic under DDoS attacks from regular traffic.
4.2.2 Flash Crowd
Marginals. Fig. 9b illustrates that "!;" distributions ade-
quately fit the marginals of the traffic under flash crowd for
a wide range of aggregation levels (from 1ms to 1s). Fig. 10b
illustrates that the !^ð!Þ and "^ð!Þ curves observed during
the event do not depart significantly from those recorded
under normal circumstances. It is consistent with the fact
that the flash crowd does not involve any mechanism that
forbids the 0 packet per window event as do DDoS attacks.
Therefore, !^ð!Þ does not enable to detect the FC.
Covariance. Fig. 8b shows the LDs for two 15 minute
long blocks of data during the flash crowd ð! ¼ 1msÞ
compared to those of 15 minute long blocks of regular
traffic, recorded before and after. On this plot, one sees that
the LDs undergo a significant change during the flash
crowd. From octaves j ¼ 8 to j ¼ 10, i.e., for scales of time
ranging from 250ms to 1s, a strong peak of energy grows.
Such a peak is never observed on traffic under regular
circumstances and can therefore be used to detect and
characterize FC. Obviously, arfimað*; d; )Þ fits (not shown
here) will fail to simultaneously reproduce the short range
dependences, the long-range dependences, and the energy
peak. Goodness-of-fit tests between data and fitted models
yield rejection, also providing us with a relevant tool for
designing a flash crowd detection procedure. Moreover, the
LRD parameter d, when estimated from octaves j coarser
than those corresponding to the energy peak, does not
notably depart from the one estimated before/after the FC.
It tells that long memory is neither caused by the flash
crowd nor modified by its occurrence. At most, the energy
peak acts as a masking effect in a subrange of time scales.
4.3 Discussions and Conclusions
Let us summarize and comment on our empirical findings.
First, we have shown that the "!;"-arfimað*; d; )Þ model
accurately reproduces the marginals and both the short-
range and long-range correlations of traffic time series. It
holds for a wide range of different regular traffic collected
on various networks, as well as for traffic containing
legitimate and illegitimate anomalies such as DDoS attacks
and flash crowds. Second, the fact that the proposed model
is versatile enough to work equally well for a wide range of
aggregation levels is a key feature. This offers an alternative
answer to the enduring issue in traffic modeling about the
choice of the relevant aggregation level !. Hence, choosing
! a priori is not easy. Therefore, using a process that offers
an evolutive modeling with ! is of high interest. Moreover,
the values of the parameters of the models obviously vary,
possibly significantly, from one traffic to another. But, we
are not interested in the values themselves, but rather in the
evolution of these parameters with respect to !. The
detection procedures, detailed in the next section, specifi-
cally take advantage of the relevance of this multiresolution
statistical description of the traffic.
5 DDOS ATTACK DETECTION
5.1 Distance-Based Detection Procedure
As reviewed in the first section, real-time detection of
anomalies in the traffic is a major issue of the Internet of
today. Anomaly detection is roughly divided between
profile-based methods and signature-based procedures (or
other methods relying on analysis of the attack mechanisms
[59] or on application-dependent analysis [60]). Previous
sections have shown that, even if one remains at the packet
level and works with aggregated time-series, a joint
analysis of the statistical profile at various time-scales of
the series is sensitive to changes caused by anomalies in the
traffic. From these properties, we propose a detection
procedure that exploits the multiresolution nature of our
statistical modeling.
Because the developed analysis is not based only on
simple statistics (mean and variance), we were able to
empirically discriminate between legitimate (FC) and
illegitimate (DDoS) changes in traffic. In this section, we
are dealing with the detection of illegitimate anomalies
because we have a wider database of DDoS attacks than of
FC; hence, FC are used as a benchmark to test the behaviors
of the detection procedures in the presence of a natural and
long-lasting increase in the traffic (however, the small
number of experiments do not allow yet us to assess a
statistical method to detect them specifically).
The detection scheme is as follows: The time series under
analysis are split into adjacent nonoverlapping time
windows of length T , starting at time lT and labeled by l.
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Fig. 10. Estimated "!;" parameters. Estimation of !^ (top) and "^
(bottom) as a function of log2! (! in ms) (a) for the DDoS Attack and (b)
for the Flash Crowd. In both cases, the curves are given during the
anomaly (crosses) and before (squares) or after (circles) the event as
references for normal traffic. For the DDoS, the mean evolution (thick
line) of the parameters on various 15 minute data blocks is drawn,
superimposed with the extremal values taken during each period
(dashed lines); for the sake of example, two typical evolutions over
one block during the DDoS are shown (in thin lines) on the graph. A
zoom for the small scales is shown as an inside-plot. For the FC event,
of smaller duration, one estimation on a 15 minutes window is reported
for each period (before, during, and after the event).
Independently for each time window l, one computes a
distance between a statistical characteristic measured on
window l and the same characteristic measured on an
a priori chosen reference window. In a second step, one
thresholds this distance to detect unexpectedly large
deviations and, hence, anomalous traffic behaviors.
There exist a variety of distances that could be used (see,
e.g., [61] for an exhaustive review). For instance, one could
use a generic nonparametric distance, such as the Kullback
divergence for the marginal distribution or the log-spectral
deviation for the spectrum (covariances). However, it
would not explicitly take advantage of the relevance of
the multiresolution model proposed in Section 3. Therefore,
we base the detection on a distance computed from the
parameters of the model, especially !^!ðlÞ and "^!ðlÞ, for a
collection a dyadic scales !, going from a fine scale 21!0 to
a large scale 2J!0. A simple, yet robust, Mean Quadratic
Distances (MQD) is defined as (!0 is left out for the ease of
notation):
D!ðlÞ ¼ 1
J
XJ
j¼1
!^2jðlÞ & !^2jðrefÞð Þ2; ð6Þ
D"ðlÞ ¼ 1
J
XJ
j¼1
"^2jðlÞ & "^2jðrefÞ
$ %2
: ð7Þ
After the computation of the distance, one a priori choice is
left: the threshold level (values under the threshold are
deemed normal traffic and values above are considered
anomalies). In the present work, a collection of threshold
values is systematically explored so as to derive the
statistical performance for the detection procedure.
5.2 Results and Statistical Performance
5.2.1 Results
In the results detailed below, the reference window consists
of TRef minutes of traffic before the occurrence of the attacks
and therefore assumed to be regular traffic. We used both
TRef ¼ 1 min and TRef ¼ 10 min for comparison and we set
!0 ¼ 1ms and J ¼ 10 in agreement with the results reported
in Section 4.
MQDs are depicted in Fig. 11 for traffic containing an
attack (here, the Iperf-III run). In Fig. 11a, one sees that
D!ðlÞ takes large values within time windows l containing
the attack. It clearly confirms that the occurrence of the
anomaly significantly alters the dependency of ! with
respect to !; hence, it increases the MQD. Conversely, one
observes that D"ðlÞ remains mostly stable and is not
significantly shifted by the occurrence of the attack.
Remember that " is a scale parameter mostly sensitive to
the intensity of the traffic. The attacks do not correspond to
traffic increase with unchanged correlation structure, but
rather to significant dynamical and statistical changes. The
large values observed in the D"ðlÞ plot correspond to time
windows that do not satisfy the .2 goodness-of-fit test
because they contain both regular and under attack traffics,
yielding aberrant estimates. Note that the large values occur
at the start and stop times of the attack.
Conversely, for the Flash Crowd experiments, the traffic
is not seen as a clear-cut anomaly. MQDs are plotted in
Fig. 12 for FC-1 and we see no particular increase in these
distances during the FC. This is because the statistical
characterization of the FC by means of !! and "! is
insensitive to this kind of variation of traffic, which is
mainly a small increase in the traffic but with exactly the
same variability, as argued in Section 4.2. Hence, the
multiscale characterization through !! and "! is mostly
unchanged and the distances D!ðlÞ and D"ðlÞ to the
reference traffic profile are not significantly different during
the FC from those without anomaly.
5.2.2 Experimental Statistical Performance
The statistical performance of detection procedures is
usually assessed in terms of Receiver Operational Char-
acteristics (or ROC curves), consisting of the correct
detection probability PD versus the false alarm probability
PF . Therefore, one plots the curves PD ¼ fð%Þ versus
PF ¼ gð%Þ, parameterized by the threshold value %. They
are obtained empirically from our database as follows.
Because we know which time window contains the attack
and which does not, we are able to calculate for each
detection level %, both PD and PF ; the probability of
detection PD is the ratio of the number of windows
containing the attack whose distance is above the threshold
to the total number of windows with anomaly; the
probability of false alarm PF is the ratio of the number of
windows containing no attack whose distance is still above
the threshold to the total number of windows without
anomaly.
Plots PD versus PF and PD ¼ fð%Þ and PF ¼ gð%Þ are
shown in Fig. 13, on the example of the Iperf-III run, as
an illustration. The ideal set point (all attacks would be
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Fig. 11. MQD for traffic containing a DDoS Attack. (a) D!ðlÞ and
(b)D"ðlÞ, computed on nonoverlapping 1 min time windows for run Iperf-
III. Time windows containing the attack are those in the gray area.
Fig. 12. MQD for traffic containing a legitimate FC anomaly.
(a) D!ðlÞ and (b) D"ðlÞ, computed on nonoverlapping 1 minute time
windows for experiment FC-1. Time windows corresponding to the FC
are those in the gray area.
detected and no false alarm raised) is the left upper
corner. The worst case is the diagonal, when the results
do not significantly differ from those obtained at random.
Fig. 13 clearly shows the efficiency of the proposed
detection procedure. ROC curves were calculated for each
and every trace containing anomalies, listed in Table 2.
All plots can obviously not be displayed; instead, we
report in Table 3 PD for two a priori chosen levels of false
alarm, set, respectively, to 10 percent and 20 percent.
They are obtained by reading on ROC curves PD for the
chosen PF level.
5.2.3 Discussion
The results are satisfactory. In the worst cases, detection is
possible with a better chance than at random. For
illegitimate anomalies with high impact on the traffic (for
instance, the runs IPerf-B, X, or Trinoo-T, see Table 2), the
detection probability is really high. For attacks with very
low intensity (such as IPerf-I, II, III, or Trinoo-M) and,
hence, little impact on traffic volume profiles, detection
rates, even if low at first sight, are encouraging as most
traditional IDS based on simple mean and variance statistics
would totally miss them. Moreover, let us mention that the
use of the mean #^! or variance $^2!of X! as functions of !
yields curves that exhibit identical forms with or without
anomaly (plots not reproduced here). Hence, sample mean
and variance estimates are blind to anomalies.
The performance reported here uses only statistics over
one minute. Obviously, better performance is expected from
the use of a detection scheme over several minutes,
combining the score functions over a past of a few
windows, because, during anomalies, the probability of
crossing the threshold on two successive window is much
larger than it is for a single window. This trade-off between
increased detection performance and increase of the delay
in the alert time (a few minutes instead of 1) needs to be
further explored.
An interesting feature of the detection method based on
the multiscale marginal modeling ("!!;"! for ! ¼ 2j!0 with
j ¼ 1; . . . ; J) lies in its being able to differentiate between
legitimate anomalies and illegitimate ones. For instance, the
Flash Crowd anomalies, which consist of a regular increase
of traffic, are not detected as attacks: The assigned detection
probabilities are close to the false alarm rate—this is not
detection, this is a false alarm! Further along the way, it
gives the capability to classify between classes of anomalies,
when combining this with other characteristics of the traffic
(such as the arfima parameters that are not yet used in the
proposed attack detection scheme). Another perspective is
to combine this detector which uses only the profile of the
traffic with methods based on signature in a full-fledged
IDS. It is an accepted fact that, to achieve good efficiency,
one has to use both approaches jointly.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In the present work, we have proposed a non-Gaussian long-
range dependent process, the "!;"-arfimaðP; d;QÞ process, to
model the first and second order statistics of aggregated
computer network traffic time series. We have fully
described operational parameter estimation procedures
and we have defined original numerical synthesis proce-
dures. We have shown from a large variety of standard
reference traffic time series that the "!;"-arfimaðP; d;QÞ
process constitutes a relevant versatile model and this is for a
very large range of aggregation levels !. Moreover, its
parameters are smoothly evolving with !, hence providing
us with a useful statistical characterization of regular traffic.
We have also shown that discrepancies from these reference
behaviors with respect to ! enabled us to distinguish
between traffic with and without anomalies and to further
discriminate between legitimate (flash crowds) and illegiti-
mate (DDoS attacks) ones. A detection procedure using this
model and yielding satisfactory results, has been defined.
This work can be further developed along numerous
directions. First, the numerical synthesis procedures can be
used for traffic generation, performance assessment, and
online traffic samples prediction, X!ðT þ -Þ for - > 0. In
that respect, the use of larger orders for P and Q as long as
they are relevant may prove beneficial. This is under study.
Second, thanks to the experimental platform being devel-
oped within the METROSEC project, we intend to further
explore the zoo of anomalies. Third, we are working on
extending the proposed detection scheme to the use of other
statistical distances (Kullback divergence, etc.) that should
help in identifying changes in the traffic statistical char-
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Fig. 13. Statistical performance. (a) Detection probability PD versus
false alarm probability PF , PD ¼ fðPF Þ, and (b) PD ¼ fð%Þ and PF ¼
gð%Þ for D!ðlÞ.
TABLE 3
Detection Rates
For each attack, detection probabilities obtained for a fixed False Alarm
probability set at 10 percent (left) and 20 percent (right). We recall here
the type and name of each run, and the intensity of the anomaly
(computed as in Table 2).
acterizations and classifying them as legitimate or illegiti-
mate. Our ultimate goal is to develop network-based
(protocols, architectures, etc.) strategies to improve the
robustness of the network against attacks and, thus, to help
maintain the targeted level of QoS.
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